

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1961

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Note of Points made during the Private Discussion between
President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Admiralty
House from 10:30 a.m. - 12:45 p.m. on Monday, June 5, 1961

I. Berlin

In Vienna Mr. Khrushchev gave the President an Aide Memoire
about Berlin. In the light of this:

- a. It would be helpful to President Kennedy to have any British suggestions on what he might say regarding Berlin in a speech he was to make in the United States on June 6 about his recent travels.
- b. It was for consideration whether the President should make a formal reply to the Aide-Memoire and if so what such a reply should say. This matter should be discussed with the French Government and probably with the Federal German Government also. It might be desirable to re-state the West's moral position as protector of the liberties of the people of West Berlin and to include a suggestion for a plebiscite for West Berlin to determine the wishes of the inhabitants. It might also be as well to include an indication that negotiations about Berlin would not seem likely to be fruitful unless Soviet good will had been demonstrated by a satisfactory agreement about Laos; it could be pointed out that if no agreement on Laos was possible, a meeting of minds about the very difficult question of Berlin was unlikely.
- c. It seemed that a Western proposal now for negotiations about Berlin might appear a sign of weakness unless the situation deteriorated so much that there seemed to be an imminent danger of war.
- d. Meanwhile, Contingency Planning for Berlin should continue. In order to make this more realistic, it might be desirable to consider what the West should do if:
 - (1) The Russians signed their Treaty with East Germany but made no change in the existing arrangements for West Berlin.
 - (2) After the signing of the Treaty civilian supplies were interrupted, or,
 - (3) Western military supplies were interfered with.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT (2045-82-306)
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BY 1963

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
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The President expressed the view that it might be desirable to increase the stockpiles for Allied troops in Berlin.

2. Laos


Mr. Khrushchev did not appear very interested in this question in Vienna. Consequently there might be advantage in indicating that unless the Russians showed a greater disposition to reach a reasonable settlement about Laos, there seemed little hope for fruitful negotiations with them on Berlin and Germany.

3. France



b. The President was prepared for some measure of closer tripartite consultation. This might mean having a tripartite meeting of foreign ministers in Geneva -- on the edges of Laos -- or in some other way. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rusk, Lord Home and Monsieur Couve de Murville should discuss the creation of a tripartite consultative structure which should include some military element.

c. On the Common Market, the President explained that President de Gaulle had expressed the view that the British must come all the way in, or not come at all. The General would not welcome an arrangement in which only the economic aspects of membership were involved, and he had expressed some doubt that the British were ready for the necessary political commitment. He had made it clear, however, that he was himself not a federalist.



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e. President de Gaulle had not spoken to the President in Paris about France's nuclear program except to explain why in his view this was necessary.

4. NATO Finances

It was agreed that little progress had been made in persuading the Federal German Government to make a more adequate contribution to the cost of maintaining United States and British troops in the Federal Republic, and that an evaluation should be made of the progress so far achieved.

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